imminent and deadly violence caused significant changes in policy whilst laying bare more visceral responses. 4 Political science studies of assassination rightly insist that the importance of assassination rarely lies with specific assassinations but rather the reaction of the state to assassination conspiracies. It is the study of patterns of assassination and state response that yields analytically valuable results. The political science studies of assassination reveal, however, the challenge of quantifying the effect of political assassination. Repeated analyses have established that it is possible to tie the frequency of political assassination to failing or fragile states. They also suggest that the impact of assassination in such fissile political environments might be measurable, although not always agreeing whether the direction of change is likely to be towards democratisation or more extreme autocracy. The political scientists have been less interested in stable democratic states, not least because it is hard for them to quantify change caused by political assassination. Political science hypothesises that stable democratic states will be 'burdened' by assassination, but admit that burdens will be less visible than in failing states. 5 Cultural sociologists also direct us towards how the pattern of assassination is framed. 6 Most notably, Ron Eyerman has argued that assassination in 'constitutional monarchies' caused 'trauma'. In particular, patterns of assassination -even if not linked in a direct causal mannercould be reframed into a specific narrative. The manner in which the 'trauma' of democratic states was manifested depended on how their assassination conspiracies were 'framed'; and that 'framing' took place retrospectively. Such framing could stretch from dismissing the existence of any conspiracy, by blaming assassinations on 'lone wolves', through identification of specific groups, killing for defined political ends, to the implication of broad communities in murder. Framing involved choice: conspiracies were rarely self-evident. 7 Sociologists conventionally analyse framing in a broad societal context, concentrating on public discourse. 8 However, in the case of assassination framing can be employed usefully also as a means of thinking about the more focused issue of 'meaning making forces' within the state apparatus. This approach takes a cue from the classic literature on framing, that describes it as the 'micromobilization of tasks and processes' and a 'revision in the manner in which people look at some problematic condition.' 9 A frame is merely a quick way of stating the question: 'what is going on; what should be going on?' 10 It was not the case that the state easily understood what was going on with regards to assassination. Groups within the state apparatus had to build a shared framework of understanding to enable them to make sense of the empirical evidence they were gathering.
In a parallel, but affinitive, development 'Copenhagen school' international relations theorists have argued that the governing apparatus of modern states has habitually framed the threat of political violence, including assassination, too widely in order to enhance its own status and power.
Notably, the very concept of 'securitization' first evolved during the terrorism boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 'Copenhagen School' maintains that the invocation of deadly threats empowered 1970s political leaders to move security out of the democratic process into a special 'sphere of security'. 11 The 'Copenhagen School' case study of counter-terrorism in Britain concentrated on 'second order frames' to reinforce the basic point of all securitization literature: 'official discourses' produce an 'intrinsic essence' of 'terrorism' when no such essence existed. The case study was explicitly 'not history'. Assassination was considered mainly in the context of rhetorical references to the 'The Assassins', the heterodox medieval sect. 12 On the other hand the increasingly assertive 'historical turn' in terrorism studies argues that the deployment of detailed archival research is vital for the study of political violence, not least because of the very types of ahistorical analysis that have been imported into history from other disciplines. 13 Merely because changes were subtle, does not mean they were unimportant, just because theorizing has taken place on the basis of limited empirical evidence, does not mean that such evidence is not recoverable. It is merely that sophisticated historical investigation is required to unearth evidence and identify change.
The available evidence is both complex and fractured, and historians should unravel it with care. Historians of earlier periods of British history have made this point strongly in recent years. 14 Rachel Hoffman, in her synoptic review of assassination across nineteenth century Europe, including Britain, argued that 'since the 1950s, historians have focused on particular assassination attacks', thus unwittingly leaving the analysis of patterns to nonhistorians. Hoffman concluded that there was a yawning historiographical gap that made it hard to trace 'how these experiences [of assassination] changed over time.' This gap was particularly acute for the twentieth century. 15 The archival study of the state and assassination in 1970s and 1980s
Britain is wholly possible. The archival record is, however, a glass both half full and half empty. As might be expected, government files related to assassination have received particularly rigorous scrubbing during the declassification of archives. 16 Retained, weeded and redacted files litter the historical record. What has reached the public domain is incomplete and fragmented. This state of affairs has significant consequences for how historical investigation must proceed. There are limits to how far it can go as a step-by-step history of decision-making. First, sometimes decisions are made 'off stage' in the record. The general direction of travel and the reverberations of decisions are observable, but the moment of decision itself can be cloaked.
Second, it is not always possible to identify key change-agents within the bureaucracy. Third, the agencies releasing records do not necessarily represent the importance of those agencies in policy-making. There is relatively little material from the files of SIS, the Security Service, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, the Home Office, the Northern Ireland Office, the Ministry of Defence, or the Department of Environment. Fourth, the records for any particular assassination case are rarely complete. Most of the case histories contain dry wells.
On the other hand, it is the collectivity of cases that yields the important trends. There are thousands of pages of available government records on assassination. In terms of bulk, by far the richest source is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The FCO was not always the lead department in policy making, but many of its departments took a close interest in assassination. The FCO also acted as a clearing-house for relevant Assassination in Britain 6 information from other ministries. The other rich seam of information is the paperwork sent to and from successive prime ministers. These files are much more episodic and general than the departmental archives but they take us into high-level decision-making.
More archival sources will become available in the future. One purpose of the current article is to propose a way of interrogating the fragmentary evidence that reaches the public domain. A close reading of the archival evidence enables us to build a nuanced account of the British state's response to assassination. state nearly powerless to prevent the ingress of assassins. 24 Prevention of terrorism law introduced in 1974 applied only to cases linked to Northern Ireland, and was thus inapplicable to the majority of assassination conspiracies. 25 The rights of political dissidents undermined the extradition or expulsion of assassins from the early 1970s onwards. 26 The expansion of higher education in the 1960s allowed assassins to merge into the wave of overseas students. 27 Long-range jet travel to Heathrow facilitated both the rapid arrival and the quick escape of assassins. 28 The reform of firearms laws in the 1968 denied guns to those who wished to protect themselves, but proved of little hindrance to assassins. Terrorist groups 'favoured operations in London, partly because British police officers were usually unarmed.' 29 London's status as a hub for the 'international press corps' guaranteed publicity for all assassins, 'irrespective of cause'. 30 The PLO said that, 'as far as London was concerned it should be considered a good place for assassinations.' 31 Police and the Security Service convened a conference to analyse the broader meaning of assassination plots in London. Importantly, they agreed to re-convene on a regular basis. 34 The conference began to retrofit previous assassinations, reaching back to the Heath government, into a conspiratorial pattern. 35 The phase initiated by Callaghan in 1978 only really ended in 1984. In
May 1984 Mrs Thatcher finally ordered a significant alteration to the treatment of assassination. Assassination was re-classified as an endemic threat involving a large number of related conspiracies. 36 The formal assessment framework within the JIC was reformed: from the spring of 1984 the prime minister was presented with constant updates on assassination conspiracies, conspirators, the interaction of conspiracies, and the potential geopolitical impact of the assassination complex. 37 These new attitudes were hard-wired into the system by the major assassination conspiracies of the autumn of 1984.
II
In retrospect the new age of assassination was deemed to have begun for
Britain in 1971. There were a series of notable assassinations and attempted assassinations in London from the end of 1971 onwards. The investigation of each assassination was, however, terminated as soon as possible.
In December 1971 an assassin machine-gunned the car of Zaid alRifai, the Jordanian Ambassador, near his diplomatic residence in
Kensington. The would-be assassin was arrested in Lyons in January 1972. 38 The British did not know which radical Palestinian faction he represented. The British hoped that they would not need to find out much more.
Without an extradition from France there could be no further investigation.
'The unworthy thought occurs,' David Gore-Booth at the FCO wrote, 'that this could in fact be the best solution so far as we are concerned.' 40 Obligingly,
France was unwilling to extradite an assassin for a 'political crime'. 41 The
British state was only too relieved to have had its scope for investigation curtailed. The senior investigating officer was asked, 'not to disturb a dog which we had every reason to think was sleeping.' The police agreed to 'keep quiet' and that seemingly brought 'this unhappy affair to an end.' 42 By the time Rifai's attacker left France, however, British suspicion had shifted away from the PFLP and the PDFLP to Black September. Black
September was the main terrorist group formed by Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 43 In September 1972, the prime minister returned to the Rifai case in the wake of Black September's massacre of Israeli Olympians in Munich. 44 The unwillingness to 'waste time' on wider assassination conspiracies in London was continued by the Labour governments that succeeded Heath.
In September 1977 Callaghan's Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Roy
Mason, announced that he would attend a reception at the Libyan embassy in
London to celebrate the eighth anniversary of Colonel Gaddafi's seizure of power. 51 Those who protested were told that, 'naturally, he would not have 67 The conclusion that Britain faced a potent set of conspiracies had barely begun to percolate Whitehall, however, when it was tested by another assassination. In July 1978 General Razzak Abdul al-Naif was assassinated in the Intercontinental Hotel, Hyde Park. The unique feature of the Naif assassination was that the conspiracy was very clear from the outset. 68 The assassin was arrested as he tried to reach a flight to Baghdad from Heathrow airport. MI5 had a 'batting order' of Iraqi intelligence in UK. 69 The Security
Service could even identify the individuals who had organized the conspiracy. 70 The assassin and his Iraqi case officer were charged with murder.
British officials realized they had reached a Rubicon. For the first time since the 1940s there was likely to be a trial in London that would reveal the true nature of an assassination conspiracy. Britain would be, 'in the situation that almost all Western governments finding themselves with alien terrorists on their hands have tried desperately to avoid.' 71 Ministers decided not to reveal the full extent of the Iraqi state assassination apparat. 72 The prime minister, Jim Callaghan, and the foreign secretary, David Owen, agreed to expel the intelligence officers. They also decided to act without publicity. 73 The Callaghan government was sensitive to criticism in the press. 79 However, ministers and officials did not accept that the press had any superior insight into the threat of assassination. They believed that public commentary was merely another means of getting at a government that was struggling politically. A newly appointed opposition spokesman, Leon Brittan, repeatedly used press reports to expose what he portrayed as the Callaghan government's dishonesty over the al-Hijri assassination. 80 The Conservative opposition was engaged in a relentless political offensive to undermine
Callaghan's tenuous grip on power. The head of the Libyan People's Bureau, Musa Kusa, 'categorically denied' that the LPB had been involved in murder when he was questioned by British officials. 100 The British government, once again, faced defining a conspiracy, in the glare of publicity, with limited information, and hindered by a disinformation campaign by the presumed guilty parties. Willie Whitelaw, the home secretary, and Peter Carrington, the foreign secretary, were in no doubt that the assassination of Ramadan had been, 'instigated by the Libyan authorities through their mission here.' The question was whether to try and pin the order for murder on Musa Kusa. They shied away from that step.
Instead Carrington proposed a plan whereby Britain would despatch a 'special emissary' to see Gaddafi with a warning to stop the assassinations. with assistance.' 'I do not wish to expel these persons as long as I have any alternative,' she assured Gaddafi. Instead she requested him to voluntarily withdraw four officials. 103 The attempts to pin blame on Gaddafi were halfhearted. 104 In private Thatcher bewailed the pusillanimity of her own response. 105 It was Musa Kusa, not the British government, who asserted that the Libyan regime was a procurer of assassination. 106 Thatcher and Carrington agreed that they now had no choice but to declare him persona non grata. 107 Whilst the Thatcher government was wrestling with the Libyan problem, the Iraqi assassination conspiracy recrudesced. In June 1982 a Black June assassin shot the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov, at the Dorchester Hotel. Argov's Special Branch bodyguard captured the assassin.
The arrest of the assassin did not, however, enable the British government to make an immediate statement on the nature of the conspiracy. 108 Only in
October 1982 did the Security Service conclude that Abu Nidal, 'organised the assassination attempt on Mr Argov' and that 'the assailants were given backing by the Iraqi Embassy.' 109 The problem with defining the conspiracy so baldly was that Britain's allies might expect the British government to take action against those suborning murder in London: 'Ministers might reasonably argue … we should do something about it. ' 110 In January 1983 the Director of Public Prosecutions re-assured the Foreign Office that, 'no evidence will be presented which in any way implicates the Iraqi Embassy.' The DPP said that his strategy was to establish that the assassination conspiracy was organised by the 'Abu Nidal group' but to go no further in open court. 111 A London jury found three men, the leader, the assassin, and the armourer, guilty in early March 1983. 112 A few days after the trial concluded the prime minister was briefed on the assassination and the court case. As her private secretary remarked, 'we are in a different world following the Brighton bomb.' 123 This conclusion was reinforced by the assassination of Indira Gandhi a few days later. 124 Assassinations were not isolated from one another: they 'demonstrated the onset of a phase of violence in world affairs.' 125 London was at the centre of that violence. 126
V
Britain viewed assassination very differently in 1984 than it had a decade-anda-half previously. The state reformed its own security in parallel with its changed understanding of assassination conspiracies. Callaghan and
Thatcher erected a 'permanent counter-assassination state', no longer relying on insouciance in the face of fear, or insisting on the temporary nature of any elevated security measures.
The change towards security was palpable. Although Special Branch, for instance, had a long-standing role in providing bodyguards for the prime minister, MPSB officers were overwhelmingly deployed on intelligence and political work in the early 1970s. 127 Counter-assassination security under the Heath government had been, literally, a joke. On 22 January 1972 a wellknown crank drenched the prime minister in ink in Brussels. Heath had a Special Branch bodyguard. Unfortunately that bodyguard had lost the prime minister in a press scrum. 128 A subsequent review revealed that the individual Special Branch protection officers assigned to the prime minister, the foreign secretary and home secretary never bothered to prepare overseas trips. They merely travelled with their minister and trusted that the local authorities had everything under control. Preparatory security visits to foreign capitals were a direct consequence of the Brussels debacle. It emerged also that foreign security officers rarely did any preparatory visits to London. 129 The real world of Middle Eastern politics forced Whitehall into something beyond humorous notes about the PM's pratfalls. 130 The review of the Brussels incident coincided with that of the Rifai assassination. 131 Rifai received a Special Branch bodyguard in the wake of the assassination attempt. 132 The Metropolitan Police deployed armed officers outside the Jordanian embassy in London. 133 The British government, reluctantly, accepted the importation of Jordanian military police embassy guards. 134 The police, however, regarded these steps as temporary emergency measures.
The guards were withdrawn in September 1972. 135 The timing of this decision was unfortunate. It coincided with the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in September 1972. In the wake of Munich there was a rushed re-deployment of uniformed guards. The police were faced with a flood of demands for protection, most of which they turned down. 136 A senior official commented that in an 'ideal world'
Britain would give the London embassies some protection; but in an ideal world the state would provide 'better protection' for ministers and judges, 'but few get it'. 137 In November 1972 an interdepartmental working party began investigating how best to protect foreign diplomats in London. The working party recommended that the Met should create a specialised two-hundredand-seventy-five man armed Diplomatic Protection Group. 'Panic buttons'
were to be the key element of this new system. Although there would be guard posts outside a few diplomatic buildings, the bulk of the DPG would be mobile. Ambassadors could summon armed protection with their 'panic button'. The allocation of Special Branch bodyguards to ambassadors would be a rare step of last resort. 138 The plan was finalised under the Heath government. 139 It was implemented by the Wilson government, and announced to foreign governments in September 1974. 140 The Initially, officials hoped that the extension of counter-assassination security would be little more than a short-term response to an immediate threat. 144 But when the police tried to withdraw protection the two prime ministers objected. 145 They argued that high value individuals should be protected from the general threat of assassination at all times and in perpetuity. 146 Once more, Callaghan agreed. Assassination protection became a permanent feature of the British political system. 147 As soon as it did so the security apparatus was faced with demands from other dignitaries. 148 The government's immediate response was the purchase of armoured cars, more armed guards, and more panic buttons. 149 Yet VIPs demanded something more glamorous. 150 The armed DPG officer guarding the Iranian embassy in London cut a pathetic figure when it was stormed by terrorists in The trouble with the 'seal off' option was that it would involve telling soon-tovisit-London leaders -presidents Mobuto, Mugabe and Banda -that they were too dangerous to have gun-toting guards. The prime minister's group plumped for 'strict practical conditions' instead. 162 The new bodyguard system was agreed before the attempt to assassinate Margaret Thatcher in Brighton in October 1984. The prime minister signed off on its 'immediate implementation' a few days after the assassination attempt. 163 The first leader to visit Thatcher in London after the Brighton assassination attempt was the Italian prime minister, Bettino Craxi. Britain, he remarked, now had an assassination problem little different from that of Italy, and other European countries. 164 Together they rolled out of Downing Street with their armed security teams in nine armoured cars. 165 In November 1984 the head of the Prime Minister's private officeRobin Butler -gave evidence to the police inquiry into the Brighton bombing.
Butler identified himself as the prime minister's principal security adviser, relying in turn on the Special Branch chief protection officer for specialist knowledge. Butler said that prime ministerial security had not changed much under Thatcher. The prime minister had a 'need to be seen and meet people'.
There Nevertheless, the security process did evolve into an explicit acceptance that politicians and foreign dignitaries were a protected separate caste. Mrs Thatcher was forced into 'boltholes' for key meetings with the prime minister of Ireland. 173 VIPs were hived off from the rest of the population. As Brittan went on to say, 'everything which can be done will be done to prevent such outrages and to protect their targets. ' 174 After her own brush with assassination, Mrs Thatcher personally oversaw reforms that made targets of assassination a 'special category' with more rights than other government officials. 175 The new 'special category' The reformers of 1984 recognised that a change in the practice of security was bound to have an effect on broader political culture. There would be a significant difference between a state in which everyone endured a low, if appreciable, threat and one in which the population of the capital was threatened by mass terrorism, but the higher political, official and diplomatic elite felt increasingly safe from assassination. 177 For the rest of the 1980s, there was very little public commentary on the re-alignment of this elite with wider British society. Counter-assassination remained, however, an important intra-elite concern. As some had expected in 1984, there was persistent mission creep as VIPs sought to define themselves as such by moving within the iron ring. By the early 1990s experts agreed that British VIP security was becoming costly, manpower intensive and byzantine. The suggested solution of more flexible security -some forms of which were just as useful for preventing wider terrorism -met opposition:
the permanent deployment of security teams had become a core signifier of VIP status. 178 The permanent possession of state police, intelligence or military security was the defining mark of the higher elite, placing them on the same level as royalty. The development of royal security in the 1870s and the 1880s had significantly altered the relationship between 'rulers and subjects'. 
